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Abstract 
 Over the years there have been a lot of undrafted free agents that have had 
successful careers in the NFL. The monopsony structure for rookies entering the NFL and 
the fact that undrafted free agents get to pick what team they play for suggests that there 
is an advantage in not getting picked in the draft. To explore this possibility, this paper 
compares the probabilities of remaining in the NFL for undrafted free agents and seventh 
round draft picks through logit regressions and survival analysis. In doing so, this paper 
describes the processes the NFL takes in order to find the most elite talent and how they 
distribute the talent throughout the whole league. The results find that undrafted free 
agents have a higher probability of exiting at the beginning of a career when compared 
with seventh round draft picks, but there is evidence that those probabilities start to 
converge later in careers. Additionally, there is evidence that there are NFL teams and 
position groups that do better and worse in retaining undrafted free agents, suggesting 
that there is a way to take advantage in going undrafted.  
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Section I: Introduction 
It is safe to assume that the most elite football players in the world end up in the 
National Football League (NFL) without any competition from other leagues. Knowing 
that, the NFL finds itself in an interesting labor market called a monopsony, where they 
face an upward sloping supply curve, so when they bring another player into the league 
they have to increase the salaries for every player causing a constant inflow of the best 
available players.1 The NFL also has practices revenue sharing, where all teams share the 
revenue from gate sales, television contracts, and general merchandise sales.2 This nature 
of the NFL has serious implications in that new players are distributed throughout the 
thirty two teams in the NFL through a draft. Throughout players’ careers through high 
school and college, team owners consistently gather information on players that will 
provide the most profit for their team, while players wait to see if they will get drafted by 
a team in the one of the yearly NFL drafts. Over the years, there has been a lot of players 
in the NFL that were not drafted and end up being one of the league’s biggest stars, while 
you might never hear anything about players who were picked in the late rounds of the 
NFL draft. There doesn’t seem to be much difference between seventh round draft picks 
and undrafted free agents in terms of salary and coaching attention when comparing them 
against early round draft picks. Seventh round draft picks and undrafted free agents make 
around $450,000,3 while first round draft picks expected salary is to be around $4 
                                                
1 Boal, William M., and Michael R Ransom. "Monopsony in the Labor Market." Journal of 
Economic Literature 35, no. 1 (1997): 86-112. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2729694 
2 Ibid. 
3  Ginnitti, Michael. "NFL Minimum Salaries for 2017." The Daily Spot. January 28, 2017. 
Accessed November 14, 2017. https://www.spotrac.com/blog/nfl-minimum-salaries-for-2017/. 
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million.4 With that kind of investment going into players, franchises are expected to put a 
lot more of their time and effort into these early round draft picks because general 
managers want their predictions on these players to pan out. This leads to coaches putting 
first round draft picks in positions where they can only prove that they can’t play, and 
leaving late round draft picks and undrafted free agents in positions where they have to 
prove that they can play.5 Other than the hit on undrafted free agents’ egos for not being 
picked by a team, there are very few differences between seventh round draft picks and 
undrafted free agents. Both players will have to compete for a spot on the team during the 
preseason and continue to perform once they do make a team. An advantage that an 
undrafted free agent has, although, is that they have the opportunity to pick what team 
they end up on by calling coaches and joining preseason workouts. His status as an 
undrafted free agent means he is free to leave and join different teams at his own will and 
put him in a more competitive labor market between teams, whereas drafted players are 
stuck with the team they were picked by unless they are released. Ray Polk, a Colorado 
safety attempting to make a NFL team, admitted that “if you get drafted, you get to say 
that you got drafted… but you go free agent, you get to choose a different fit or different 
scenarios that you can put yourself into”6 and even Andy Reid, Kansas City Chiefs head 
coach, acknowledged that “as far as making [a] team, maybe it’s not [not better to be 
drafted]... if you look at the stats, there are a whole lot of undrafted free agents playing in 
the NFL right now… you can choose where you go, where you have a chance to make 
                                                
4 Riddle, Ryan. "The Hidden Advantage of Being a High NFL Draft Pick." Bleacher Report. 
April 12, 2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Stapleton, Arnie. "It's quite frequently better to go undrafted in the NFL." DeseretNews.com. 
April 23, 2013. Accessed November 14, 2017.  
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the team.”7 As a player that might be drafted in the late rounds of the NFL draft, it is 
possible that the route of going undrafted and picking the team you will play with will 
lead you to a longer career in the NFL .  
Starting with first round drafts picks, the difference in skill between the next 
round gets smaller and smaller up until the seventh round where the picks can be a toss-
up due to a lack of information that teams might have on players of that skill level, 
leaving team owners to make their own opinions on the player’s ability and leaving a lot 
of players to not get drafted. This leads us to think that these players can perform just as 
well, if not better, as late round draft picks, but what makes that decision described in the 
last paragraph so difficult is the lack of actual empirical evidence that can show that 
undrafted free agents will do better than late round draft picks. The only criteria that 
players can base their decision off of is the experiences of other players that have done it, 
and while it might be helpful to see what other players have done to accomplish their 
dreams of playing in the NFL, it is important to see the numerical evidence for it or 
against it. Also, while there are a lot big names that went undrafted, there are a lot more 
undrafted free agents that you haven't heard about that failed to have a NFL career. In this 
paper, I will compare the probability of exiting the NFL as an undrafted free agent to the 
probability of seventh round draft picks exiting through a logit regression model and 
survival analysis to see if undrafted agents actually have a better chance to have a longer 
career in the NFL. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section II, I will provide some background on 
undrafted free agents to tell you more about the recruitment process for the NFL, the 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
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monopsony exploitation in the NFL, the draft process and some of its pitfalls, and then 
how undrafted free agents make a career in the NFL. In section III, I will describe how I 
gathered the data on undrafted free agents in order to do the regressions, as well as what 
the data consists of, and then I will show you some of the summary statistics to get a 
better idea of how I constructed the data set. In section IV, I will describe the model I 
used and what variables I included in the regressions. In sections V and VI, I will 
describe the results of the regressions and how it applies to the important decision in 
going undrafted or going late in the NFL draft in the conclusion. 
 
Section II: Background 
A. NFL Recruitment  
As we will learn in the section, every player has a different story on how they 
made it into the NFL, but every organization follows a similar process in finding their 
talent. Carl T. Kitchens analyzes NFL recruiting and describes the process that these 
organizations go through in his paper “Are Winners Promoted Too Often? Evidence from 
the NFL Draft 1999-2012”.8 There are two scouting agencies in the NFL, BLESTO 
(Bears Lions Eagles Steelers Talent Organization) and National for all the other teams. 
These agencies provide a list of draft eligible players and an initial grade of the talent 
level. Teams will then take this list and send regional scouts to all parts of the country to 
talk to people that helped a potential player such as coaches, trainers, and academic 
advisors, in order to get an idea of the player’s characteristic and finish his profile. It is 
important to note that a lot of the attention from scouts is mainly put on the higher ranked 
                                                
8 Kitchens, Carl T. "Are Winners Promoted Too Often? Evidence from the NFL Draft 1999-
2012." Economic Inquiry 53, no. 2 (April 2015): 1317-1330. 
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schools with a larger pool of draft eligible players, so players from smaller schools don’t 
get the same kind of attention and, therefore, coaches and scouts have to judge their 
success partly on the team’s success.9 After, scouts assess the player’s abilities and how 
they could actually fit into the offense or defense. Additionally, coaches, scouts, and 
managers will attend big games that will have a lot of talents, like bowl games, to get a 
firsthand account of how the players compete. 
Once a player’s college season is over they can declare for the draft and if the 
player impresses the coaches or scouts enough, they will get invited to the NFL scouting 
combine in Indianapolis, Indiana. At the NFL scouting combine, player’s physical 
capacities are examined through a variety of tests that include: 40-yard dash, bench press, 
vertical jump, broad jump, 3-cone drills, the shuttle run, as well as various position 
specific drills. Player’s mental capacities and personalities are also measured through 
interviews and tests that include the Wonderlic test, which is “a timed SAT-style exam to 
determine how the athlete is able to think under a time constraint.”10 They are also 
measured for their height, weight, examined by doctors to check for injury risk, screened 
for banned substances, and their college film is deeply analyzed. All of these tests and 
examinations combined, players have a great chance to make an impression on a coach, 
especially if they excel in one particular area. The problem is that some players with great 
abilities might not be invited to this scouting combine to show off their skills for that lack 
of attention his school may receive. It may even be the case that a player does get invited 
to the scouting combine without any tangible skills that makes him stand out to coaches, 
which could hinder his chances of being picked in the draft, even though his best traits as 
                                                
9 Ibid, 1320. 
10 Ibid, 1321. 
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a football players are intangibles, like competitiveness or drive, which are not and cannot 
be accurately measured in the NFL scouting combine. Every player that gets drafted was 
most likely at the scouting combine, meaning that it can be the main determinate on why 
players get picked in the seventh round or not at all. If one player does better than another 
player of the same skill level in one aspect of the combine, then a team is going to pick 
that player leaving the other to go undrafted. If a player doesn’t get invited to the 
scouting combine, he probably isn’t going to be drafted, but there are many smaller 
scouting combines held after the main one that players get invited to show off their skills 
and get the attention from teams that will allow them to tryout. 
B. Monopsony Exploitation in the NFL 
Being a revenue sharing league, teams want to work together to maximize profits. 
Scott Atkinson, Linda Stanley, and John Tschirhart suggest in their article, “Revenue 
Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An Example from the National Football 
League,” that one way of maximizing profits is to distribute the talent of players 
throughout the whole league.11 Since they share the revenue of gate sales and television 
contracts, talent being spread across the whole league will lead to the fan base being more 
spread out through the league and create a higher aggregated revenue, rather than all the 
fans being attracted to one “super team.” To ensure that the talent is distributed evenly, 
the NFL holds a draft every year, and whether it is intentional or not, there is monopsony 
exploitation because of it. 
                                                
11 Atkinson, Scott E., Linda R. Stanley, and John Tschirhart. "Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in 
an Agency Problem: An Example from the National Football League." The RAND Journal of 
Economics 19, no. 1 (1988): 27-43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555395. 
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 A good example of monopsony exploitation in professional sports is shown in 
Gerald Scully’s analysis, “Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball,” where he 
compares the salaries of baseball players with their marginal revenue product during the 
“reserve clause” days, where players had to stay with their team unless they were traded 
or sold. He found that the average players was only getting paid around 20% of their 
marginal revenue product while star players were only getting paid 15% of their marginal 
revenue product.12 This paper provided evidence that players under a monopsony get paid 
less than players under a competitive market. With the reserve clause gone, the NFL 
doesn’t have a monopsony over a player’s whole career, but rather just during the entry 
phase of a NFL player, where the player has hardly any bargaining power over the team 
owners, leading them to accept salaries that are less than their marginal revenue product. 
If an undrafted free agent is found to have a similar talents of a drafted player, he has 
immediate bargaining power with the teams that might offer higher salaries because of 
his status as a free agent, whereas drafted players don’t have that ability, supporting that 
competitive markets lead to higher salaries. This fact, although, could give reason to team 
owners to not invest in undrafted players at all because there is always the possibility that 
they leave.  
 Players entering the league are also subjected to the collective bargaining 
agreement and the rookie cap, which both decrease the salaries for rookies and make 
them more attractive to invest in. The collective bargaining agreement created a price 
floor that must be agreed upon by the owners as well as the existing players in the 
players’ union, the National Football League Players Association, where players are more 
                                                
12 Scully, Gerald W. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball." The American Economic 
Review 64, no. 6 (1974): 915-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1815242. 
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concerned with their own compensation and less concerned how the new players are 
getting paid.13  The rookie cap ensures that “a portion of each franchise’s total salary cap 
is allotted each for contracting with players entering the league for the first time,” where 
rookie contracts can be determined by their draft order so if they choose not to sign or 
release a drafted player their rookie salary cap will be reduced in accordance with the 
player’s draft position, and therefore, reducing bargaining power even more .14 These 
monopolistic policies create an investment in rookies to be a low risk high reward one, 
specifically for late round draft picks and undrafted free agents, because they can buy 
them very cheap with the option to release and get their money back or keep them if they 
pan out to be valuable players.  
C. The NFL Draft 
Coaches and scouts use the abundance of information they gather from visiting 
player’s institutions and their performance during the NFL scouting combine to try and 
make an informed decision of what players will contribute the most to their organization 
and who to pick during the NFL draft. The draft is held after the super bowl and team 
with the worse win percentage get the first pick, the team with the second worse win 
percentage gets the second pick, and so on until each team is assigned a draft position. 
There are seven rounds and each team gets one pick per round, where these picks can be 
used to trade players or trade draft picks.15 In Kitchens paper, he gather data on player’s 
schools, combine results, and their career statistics in the NFL for players from 1999 to 
                                                
13 Pyle, Benjamin D., "The Law and Economics of Monopsony in the NFL: An Analysis of the 
NFL Rookie Draft and Countervailing Force" (2013). CMC Senior Theses. 612. 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/612. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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2012 to run regressions to determine if playing for a successful college program affects 
labor market opportunities in the NFL, and if players that were drafted earlier than 
expected had more or less success during their NFL career. He found that players who 
were drafted ahead of scouts’ expectations tend to have worse career outcomes relative to 
players drafted according to projections and player’s college institution has no effect on 
career success aside from the initial advantage in draft position, suggesting that there is 
statistical discrimination that negatively affects players from low-ranked college football 
teams.16 These findings can be an explanation why so many undrafted players might 
actually make a career in the NFL. A player could go to a small school that doesn’t get 
the same attention from organizations, to where they don’t have enough information on a 
player to feel comfortable enough to draft them, leaving them to go under the radar and 
find a team that will actually find some value in his abilities.  
What goes unnoticed is that the ability to accurately pick players that will 
contribute to the team success the most is very difficult task. Cade Massey and Richard 
H. Thaler state in their paper, “The Loser’s Curse: Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency 
in the National Football League Draft*”, that “teams must first make predictions about 
the future performance of (frequently) immature young men. Then they must make 
judgements about their own abilities.”17 In their paper, Massey and Thaler intensely 
compare the market value of draft picks with the expected value of a draft pick to 
investigate the accuracy of team’s judgement and decision making during the NFL draft. 
What they conclude is that the more information a team has on a player, the more 
                                                
16 Ibid, 1328. 
17 Massey, C. and Thaler, R. (2005). Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency in the National 
Football League, NBER Working Paper No. 11270. 
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overconfident they will be in picking this player and that teams overvalue early draft 
picks compared to later draft picks. This is due to teams not having enough time to do the 
in depth analysis for each pick to really predict the future value, leading to bias picks.18 
These findings support that when we get to the later rounds of the draft that there isn’t 
much difference between those players and undrafted players besides the fact that a team 
might have more information on the drafted player to be able for the team to draft him 
over the undrafted player. There is no evidence that shows that seventh round or late draft 
picks have better success in the NFL.  
D. Making it Undrafted 
Some of the most iconic names in football are those of undrafted free agents who 
had taken a long path less traveled to reach their success in the NFL. Tony Romo, who 
recently just retired and will soon be inducted into the Dallas Cowboys Hall of Fame, was 
an undrafted free agent signed by the Cowboys in 2003. He was known as the best athlete 
in his hometown of Burlington, Wisconsin, where he was the starting quarterback at his 
high school that went 3-6 his senior year. Due to his numbers in high school and his poor 
mechanics, he ended up accepting a partial scholarship to play football at Eastern Illinois, 
a Division I-AA school. In college, his coaches didn’t think that he had the best abilities 
or even know how to compete, but Tony would practice throwing every day and watch 
NFL quarterbacks on film to try and recreate their mechanics so much that he ended up 
winning the starting position and would accumulate 85 touchdowns, 8,212 passing yards, 
and win the Walter Payton Award as a senior. Yet, NFL coaches were still very tentative 
                                                
18 Ibid, 35. 
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to draft him because of his mechanics and the school he went to.19 Wes Welker, the a 
receiver that holds many franchise and NFL records, was also passed up by all thirty two 
teams in the 2004 NFL draft. In high school he had 3,235 rushing yards, 2,551 receiving 
yards, 90 total touchdowns, 22 interceptions, 10 fumble recoveries, and clutch field goal 
kicks, yet he didn’t have a college offering him a scholarship to play football. Schools 
thought that was wasn’t big enough at 5’9”, 185 pounds, and wasn’t fast enough with a 
4.5 40-yard dash.20 He attended a lot of different recruiting camps but the touch football 
they would play wasn’t actually a good determinant of Wes Welker’s skills. It wasn’t 
until Mike Leach gave him a shot after signing day and was convinced enough to give 
him a scholarship to play football at Texas Tech, where he would set school records with 
259 career receptions, 3,069 yards, 21 touchdowns, 1,761 punt return yards, and eight 
punt return touchdowns.21 Although he had a great career in college, the talks of him 
being too small and slow came up again when considering him for the next level of play 
and leaving him to go undrafted. Both of these players were purely assessed based off the 
school they went to and/or their physical capabilities and their intangibles that made them 
such good players were not considered, which left them at a huge disadvantage to be 
drafted, but there are certain ways that an undrafted player can find a spot on a team. A 
key feature of this lack of screening is that these players know their intangibles better 
                                                
19 Layden, Tim. 2006. "Silver Star." Sports Illustrated 105, no. 23: 66-74. Academic Search 
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2017). 
20 Howe, Jeff. "Wes Welker Has Spent Football Life Proving Doubters Wrong, From College 
Coaches to NFL Executives." NESN. January 3, 2012. Accessed November 14, 2017. 
https://nesn.com/2012/01/wes-welker-has-spent-football-life-proving-doubters-wrong-from-
college-coaches-to-nfl-executives/. 
21 Ibid. 
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than any other scout does and if he has enough information on the teams, he could pick a 
team that would value his abilities and lead him to a better chance of being successful.  
 Once the draft is over, teams can sign as many undrafted free agents as they want 
as long as they stay within their 90-man offseason roster, where they are treated like any 
other player and are subject to roster cuts. To understand how they can take advantage of 
their situation, it is important to show how a team cuts down the 90-man offseason roster 
down to the 53-man roster over the course of the preseason. Marc Lillibridge from 
Bleacher Report gives a great breakdown of how a roster is built in his article “The 
Anatomy of a 53-Man Roster in the NFL.”22 Teams are constantly tweaking these 
numbers but this is pretty general for a base offense and a 3-4 base defense. 53 people 
can be on the roster but only 46 can dress out for a game and you can see transactions for 
practice squad players to join the team for one game if there are certain injuries on the 
team, which can be huge opportunities for some undrafted players. There are usually 
three quarterbacks on a 53-man roster but usually only two quarterbacks dress out. There 
are four running backs or full backs dressing out for a game, which is high because there 
are a lot of injuries that come with this position. Most teams will have maximum 4 
receivers on the field at once, but six are usually on the roster because wide receivers are 
athletic enough to play on special teams and be a team’s returner. Unless you are the 
Green Bay Packers who once had five tight ends, teams usually have three. One is a 
starter who can do everything, one is usually just a blocking tight end, and the third is a 
hybrid that can help out on special teams. Most teams will have ten offensive linemen on 
                                                
22 Lillibridge, Marc. "The Anatomy of a 53-Man Roster in the NFL." Bleacher Report. April 12, 
2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1640782-the-anatomy-of-
a-53-man-roster-in-the-nfl. 
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their roster, but this fluctuates quite a bit due to team preferences. For a 4-3 defense, there 
are usually nine defensive linemen, while if it’s a 3-4 defense the number is usually seven 
or eight. There are usually seven linebackers on the roster because a lot of these players 
are great special team players. Much like the linebackers, there are usually ten defensive 
backs on the roster because these players can be great special team players. Throw in a 
punter, a kicker, and a long snapper and you have a 53-man roster.23 Given the 
breakdown of a NFL roster, undrafted free agents can try out for teams that might be 
lacking in a certain position, whether it be because of injuries, players retired, or players 
will soon be retiring, and then they could put themselves in the best situation to make the 
team.  
 An undrafted free agent actually making the team comes down to what they can 
accomplish during the preseason. To achieve success, undrafted free agents must perform 
at their best during training camp and continue that level of performance throughout their 
whole career, whereas veterans or high draft picks can have a few slip-ups without 
affecting them. The NFL rosters are made up of people who the owner invested a lot of 
money into and expect to see the returns, so they are going to get most of the reps during 
training camp to improve their skills, while undrafted free agents are not much of an 
investment so don’t get as many opportunities to showcase their skills. Undrafted free 
agents are not expected to be starts on the team right way or start playing immediately, 
but if they want to find a way to get on the field they have to find how to stand out or find 
                                                
23 Ibid 
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a role on the team.24 For example, Wes Welker stood out during his time on the chargers 
because he wasn’t getting the amount of reps he wanted so he would hover behind the 
huddle to hear the play and then walk to the opposite side of the field to run the play on 
his own so he could learn the playbook.25 Also, during his first year with the Miami 
Dolphins, Wes Welker was Miami’s punt/kick returner and did not have any receptions.26 
Eventually he would hold Dolphins franchise records for most career kick return yards, 
most career combined kick and punt return yards, most all-purpose yards in a single 
season, and most punt return yards in a single season.27 Some of these undrafted free 
agents might have a specific skill that is only good for a team specific on field package, 
and some may better suited for special teams when starters are preferred to not be on the 
field.28 They just need to show that they are better in a particular role than someone else 
to get a roster spot.  
Preseason games might be some of the only times during camp that rookies and 
undrafted free agents will get a chance to show that they are better than someone else, 
and see how they match up to actual competition. Dan Hope states in his article, “How an 
                                                
24 Hope, Dan. "How an Undrafted Free Agent Becomes an NFL Star." Bleacher Report. April 11, 
2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1710889-how-an-
undrafted-free-agent-becomes-an-nfl-star. 
25 Howe, Jeff. "Wes Welker Has Spent Football Life Proving Doubters Wrong, From College 
Coaches to NFL Executives." NESN. January 3, 2012. Accessed November 14, 2017. 
https://nesn.com/2012/01/wes-welker-has-spent-football-life-proving-doubters-wrong-from-
college-coaches-to-nfl-executives/. 
26 Hope, Dan. "How an Undrafted Free Agent Becomes an NFL Star." Bleacher Report. April 11, 
2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1710889-how-an-
undrafted-free-agent-becomes-an-nfl-star. 
27 Sports Reference. "Pro Football Reference." Advertisement. Football Stats and History The 
complete source for current and historical NFL, AFL, and AAFC players, teams, scores and 
leaders. Accessed November 14, 2017. https://www.pro-football-reference.com/. 
28 Hope, Dan. "How an Undrafted Free Agent Becomes an NFL Star." Bleacher Report. April 11, 
2017. Accessed November 14, 2017. http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1710889-how-an-
undrafted-free-agent-becomes-an-nfl-star. 
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Undrafted Free Agent Becomes an NFL Star,” that “preseason performances mean very 
little for an established veteran, but they can make or break a career for an undrafted free 
agents.”29 When you are in these preseason games, or any situation in general, Dan Hope 
also thinks that it is important to play with a chip on your shoulder like undrafted Arian 
Foster, who during a 2011 interview said “No disrespect to anybody who was on the 
roster at the time in Houston, but I looked at the guys and felt like I was a better running 
back than they were… That’s not being arrogant. That’s just the confidence of an athlete. 
I think you have to have that.”30 Undrafted free agents must gain the respect of coaches 
and players to have a chance of making the roster, which means they have to be ready to 
fight during camp and do literally anything while staying level headed. Tony Romo was 
on the Cowboys for three years before he won the spot for the backup quarterback, and 
even when it seemed like he wasn’t going to ever play, he continued to practice hours on 
end improving every aspect of his game. He did all of this so when the starting 
quarterback got hurt in 2006, he was ready to come in and compete for his team.31 This 
brings me to the next point.  
Overall, the most important thing an undrafted free agent can do is to take 
advantage of every opportunity they get whether it be big or small. After his college 
career at Northern Iowa, Kurt Warner went to go work at a grocery store gaining a salary 
of $5.50 an hour while training to play in the NFL. When no calls came from the NFL, he 
started playing in an Arena Football League, where he would lead his team to two 
different Arena Bowls in 1996 and 1997 seasons. Eventually, the head coach of the Rams 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 
31 Layden, Tim. 2006. "Silver Star." Sports Illustrated 105, no. 23: 66-74. Academic Search 
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 14, 2017). 
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reached out to him and was signed to play in the NFL Europe league for the Amsterdam 
Admirals, and when the starting quarterback had a season ending injury in 1999, he had 
to take over. Kurt Warner ended up playing in all 16 games that season, threw for 4,353 
passing yards, 41 touchdowns, and lead his team to win Super Bowl XXXIV where he 
won Super Bowl MVP and forever went down for one of the greatest underdog stories 
ever told.32  
It is important to note that seventh round draft picks, and any late round draft pick 
for that matter, have to compete at the same level as undrafted free agents during the 
preseason. They might have a slight advantage over undrafted free agents because owners 
have biases on their picks and want them to pan out, but undrafted free agents have an 
advantage to pick the team that will avoid those biases and put him in the best situation to 
succeed during the preseason.  
 As you can see from what I detailed above, there are a lot of reasons that a player 
can go under the radar and not be drafted onto a NFL team. This doesn’t mean that these 
players are not as good as players that were drafted. It may just mean that their school 
was not given any attention and, therefore, they weren’t given enough attention to be a 
viable pick in the draft, or it could mean that coaches and scouts didn’t take into account 
the intangible aspects that makes them such a good player and instead just focused on the 
visible measures that they can test for. Organizations don’t have enough resources to be 
able to fully evaluate each player that is eligible for the draft and then accurately forecast 
their future performance leading to some players going undrafted. This isn’t to say that 
                                                
32 G., Gary. "Kurt Warner: A True Underdog Story." Bleacher Report. April 12, 2017. Accessed 
November 14, 2017. http://bleacherreport.com/articles/168590-stocking-shelves-to-winning-a-
ring-a-true-underdog-story. 
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all undrafted free agents are undervalued and should have been drafted. For the most part, 
players that are trying to become an undrafted free agent are taking a shot in the dark and 
never had a chance to make a team, but these players might be taking this shot because 
they see an advantage in picking what team to try out for and they know what it takes to 
have a career in the NFL from the experience of current and previous players. What I 
plan to do for the rest of this paper is to provide you with some empirical evidence that 
could support the argument undrafted players have a longer duration in the league than 
seventh round draft picks.  
 
Section III: Data 
The task of gathering data that contained undrafted free agents was a difficult and 
tedious effort. My sample contains the rosters for all 32 teams from 2008-2017, which I 
had to individually download and aggregate onto a single spreadsheet. Every roster was 
downloaded from Pro Football Reference, a website that contains all stats and history of 
players, teams, scores, and leaders.33 The final product was a unbalanced panel of 19,989 
observations with 6,133 different players that entered and left the NFL at different times. 
Each observation contains data of the player’s number, name, age, position, games 
played, games started, weight, height, college, birthday, the current season they are in, 
average value, current team they are on, current year they are in, the team they were 
drafted onto, the year they were drafted, and the round and pick they were of the draft. 
The last four data points are the most crucial data point in that if they were blank, it 
                                                
33 Sports Reference. "Pro Football Reference." Advertisement. Football Stats and History The 
complete source for current and historical NFL, AFL, and AAFC players, teams, scores and 
leaders. Accessed November 14, 2017. https://www.pro-football-reference.com/. 
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indicated that this player was an undrafted free agent. The only data points that would 
change for each observation of a player would be the age, games player, games started, 
possibly the team, the year they were in, and what season they were in, which is the most 
important data point. The season data point indicates how long a certain player was in the 
NFL. One limitation of the data is that I include the data for 2017 but since we don’t have 
the data for 2018 yet, we can’t tell if a player exited the league after that season. One 
small concern about the data is that there are missing variables for random observations 
that will create different totals for some of the descriptive statistics, but the effect is 
minimal on the regressions. 
For the following descriptive statistics, please refer to the appendix. Summary of 
the variables that are strictly related to the player can be found in Table 1. As you can 
see, the mean age of the sample is 26, with the minimum and maximum at 21 and 46, 
respectively. Games played and games started are the totals for a player in a single 
season, so the max for any observation is the amount of games the team played in that 
particular season. The mean weight is about 243 pounds and the mean height is 74 inches 
(6’2”). The average amount of seasons a player will play in this sample is around 4 or 5, 
but you can tell by Diagram 1 that there are some outliers in this sample that have played 
up to 23 seasons in the NFL. 
The following statistics are provided to show you how that data is split up 
between rounds, years, position, and team. Table 2 shows how the data is split up 
between rounds and position. You can see that there are more undrafted players than any 
other total for a particular round in this sample. Also, undrafted players make up the 
majority for kickers, long snappers, and punters. This could be because these positions 
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are such a niche specific position that don’t require teams to rely on draft picks to acquire 
them, because anyone could practice enough to be NFL caliber. You can see in Table 3, 
although, that undrafted free agents make up the largest percentage of players that exit in 
this sample. An interesting note on Table 3 is that there is a larger percentage of first 
round draft picks to exit compared with second and third round draft picks. This could be 
due to that added pressure of being a first round draft pick and don’t live up to team 
expectations, causing them to leave, or it could be that these players play more in their 
career, which may lead to a shorter career due to potential injuries. Table 4 and Table 5 
are provided to show the total amount of players in each year, total amount of players on 
each team, and the exit percentage respectively. Each team has a different amount of 
players because the rosters for each year include the 53-man roster plus however many 
practice squad players each team has, which differs for each team due to preferences.  
 
Section IV: Model and Specifications 
 To see if undrafted free agents have an advantage by going undrafted in the NFL 
draft, I will be using a logit model. I am using this model because the dependent variable 
that we will be looking at is whether or not a player has exited (retired) from the NFL. 
This variable is a binary variable, i.e., it can only be true or false denoted by either a one 
or zero. The main specifications will follow this model: 
 
The dependent variable, yi* , represent whether or not the player has exited. The 
covariates, Xi’, are all the variables from the data set that are not direct results of how 
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well they are doing in the NFL or unmeasurable, so I will be excluding games played, 
games started, and their average value, the college they went to, and their birthday. This 
leaves age, weight, height, current year, current season, round they were drafted in, the 
team they are on (represented by numbers in alphabetical order), and the dummy 
variables for the undrafted free agents and seventh round draft picks. The first 
specification consists of only 6 covariates which includes: age, weight, height, year, 
rounds, which is a categorical variable where the first seven are the actual NFL draft 
rounds and the eighth round represents undrafted free agents. I use these covariate as the 
base specification to show how the covariates react with each other across all players for 
all rounds. For the second specification I dropped the round covariate, and, instead, added 
the dummy variable for undrafted free agents. Also, to see how undrafted free agents 
interacted with the progression of seasons and particular teams, I expanded the season 
covariate to twenty-three different covariates to represent the spread of NFL duration and 
I added the team covariate which includes all thirty-two teams. For comparison reasons, 
the third specification is the same as the second but the undrafted free agent dummy 
variable is replaced with a seventh round draft pick dummy variable to see the differences 
between being drafted late and being undrafted. 
In addition to the specifications laid out above, I also provide a series of eleven 
different position sub models to show which positions have the best chances of lasting in 
the NFL as an undrafted free agent. These submodels will all look like specification two, 
but with the addition of a single dummy variable that will indicate the different positions 
which include: defensive backs (DBs), offensive lineman (OL), running backs (RBs), 
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defensive lineman (DL), tight ends (TE), quarterbacks (QBs), linebackers (LBs), wide 
receivers (WRs), kickers (K), punters (P), and long snappers (LS). 
 We will use the maximum likelihood estimator to estimate our model, where we 
are taking the maximum of the log-likelihood function, the log-likelihood function being 
the log of the function below.   
 
Using the maximum likelihood estimator, we get an unbiased β and an efficient variance-
covariance. We use this estimation method because our dependent variable is binary and 
OLS cannot be applied, so instead of minimizing the squared residuals, we maximize the 
likelihood function to determine the values of the parameters that would most likely lead 
to exiting the NFL. 
In addition to the maximum likelihood estimator, I will also be using the Kaplan-
Meier Estimator to construct a survival curve to visually see how the probability of exit 
changes from season to season. This equation for this estimator goes as follows: 
 
 
 
Where di  are the number of exits at time t and ni is the number of players at risk of exit 
right before time t.34Savvas Tjortjoglou uses the Kaplan-Meier Estimator in his analysis 
                                                
34 Tjortjoglou, Savvas. "Surviving the NFL - Survival Analysis using Python." Savvas 
Tjortjoglou. August 05, 2016. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://savvastjortjoglou.com/nfl-
survival-analysis-kaplan-meier.html. 
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of surviving the NFL using python to create series of survival curves for each position.35 I 
do something very similar but instead I am controlling for being an undrafted free agent 
or a seventh round draft pick.  
Section V: Regression Results 
 For the following tables and diagrams, please refer to the appendix. The 
regression results for main specifications can be found in Table 6, where numbers 
without parentheses represent the marginal effects with their respective confidence 
intervals (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and the numbers in parentheses represent their 
respective standard errors. For the base specification, I found that age and height are both 
significant at the 1% significance level to where an increase in age by one year will 
increase the probability of exit by 8.5%, and an increase in height by one inch will 
decrease the probability of exit by 2.6%. The significance of the results is consistent 
throughout every model and sub model with minor differences in the marginal effects, so 
I will only mention these variables again when necessary. As you can see in the base 
specification, the significance for which round you are drafted in doesn’t come into play 
until the fifth round. The marginal effect for being drafted in the fifth or sixth is a 14.8% 
increase in the probability of exiting at a 5% significance level, while being drafted in the 
seventh round increases your probability of exit by 36.2% at the 1% significance level 
and going undrafted increases your probability of exit by 39.5% at the 1% significance 
level, leaving only a 3.3% difference of exit probability from being drafted and going 
undrafted. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates between rounds and undrafted free 
agents in Diagram 2 provides a good illustration of how the difference in survival 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
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probability between draft positions increases through the first few seasons and then starts 
to converge in the later seasons.  
 Specifications two and three, also found in Table 6, show the regression results 
for undrafted free agents and seventh round draft picks while including season and team 
covariates. Asides from age, where the marginal effect on the probability of exit by a year 
increase in age is greater by 3.6% for seventh round draft picks, every other results shows 
a greater probability of exit for undrafted free agents. Both undrafted players and seventh 
round draft picks share a similar pattern in marginal effects in seasons two through 
season eight, where all significant results yield a negative marginal effect on the 
probability of exit. For undrafted players, the marginal effect decreases from -3.8% in 
season two to -3% season three, and then it increased to -4.3% by season five, then takes 
a drop from season six to -3% in season seven, and then finally rises again in season eight 
to -3.2%. For seventh round draft picks, the marginal effect decreases from -4.3% in 
season two to -3.9% season three, and then it increased to -6.9% by season six, then takes 
a drop from season six to -5.6% in season seven, and then finally rises again in season 
eight to -6.2%, but then the results continue to be significant through every single season, 
whereas the results for undrafted players stopped being significant by season nine. Due to 
a lack of observations for players in either group making it past season eighteen, I will 
ignore the results that come after. Overall, the covariate of being undrafted has a 30% 
marginal effect increase in the probability of exit, while the covariate of being a seventh 
round draft pick only has a 19% increase. All results laid out above are significant at a 
1% significance level. Although the regressions show a greater probability of exit for 
undrafted free agents, a closer look at the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates in Diagram 3 
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show survival estimates that are converging to where by season nine, undrafted players 
show a greater chance of survival than seventh round draft picks.  
There were only a few teams that yielded a significant result. The teams that had a 
positive marginal effect on the probability of exit were the Chicago Bears at a 10% 
significance level, the Detroit Lions at a 5% significance level, and the New York Giants 
at a 10% significance level. All marginal effects for these teams were in between 20% 
and 30%, meaning that if an undrafted or seventh round player were to be playing on any 
of these teams, they would have a greater probability to exit the NFL. The teams that had 
a negative marginal effect on the probability of exit were the Cincinnati Bengals at a 10% 
significance level for undrafted players and a 5% significance level for seventh round 
draft picks, and the Green Bay Packers at a 10% significance level. All marginal effects 
for these teams are in between -20% and -30%, meaning that if an undrafted or seventh 
round player were to be playing on either one of these teams, they have a lower 
probability to exit the NFL. 
The regression results for the position sub-models can be found on Table 7. The 
marginal effects for the positions that have a significant result are, running backs at 23%, 
defensive lineman at -22%, linebackers at 10%, kickers at -71%, and punters at -63%. All 
are significant at the 1% significance level, besides linebackers, which is at a 5% 
significance level. The undrafted free agent indicator is significant for each position with 
an average marginal effect of 30% on the probability of exit. Weight is only significant 
for defensive lineman, where a one-pound increase in weight would cause a .1% increase 
in the probability of exit. The marginal effect of height for running backs is 1.8% at a 5% 
significance level, which is the only one that falls below 2%. All other results follow the 
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same trend as specification two. Given these marginal effects, undrafted free agents have 
a greater chance of lasting in the NFL a kicker, punter, or defensive lineman. The 
Diagrams 4-14 compare the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates between undrafted players 
and seventh round draft picks for each position. Looking at the diagrams you can see that 
seventh round player’s survival estimates are greater than undrafted players throughout 
the seasons for each position. You can see, though, that once players get close to season 
ten, the survival estimates for undrafted and seventh round players start to converge to a 
similar number. This is because once a player is in the league for that long he has already 
established himself and the round that he was drafted in doesn’t matter because he is 
experienced.  Kickers are the only players who survival estimates actual become greater 
for undrafted free agents at around season seven.  
 
Section VI: Conclusion 
 In this paper, we want to see if undrafted free agents had a better chance of lasting 
longer in the NFL compared to seventh round draft picks. What I found was that, overall, 
the probability of exiting the NFL is higher for undrafted free agents than for seventh 
round draft picks, but there does seem to be an advantage in going undrafted. I found 
evidence that the Cincinnati Bengals and the Green Bay Packers do particularly well in 
retaining undrafted players and that the Chicago Bears, Detroit Lions, and the New York 
Giants do poor job in retaining undrafted players. Also, I found evidence that kickers, 
punters, and defensive lineman tend to give undrafted free agents a better chance of 
lasting longer in the NFL. Given these two findings, it very well could be the case that an 
undrafted player could either pick to try out for the Packers or Bengals, or that he could 
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try and find a team that is lacking defensive lineman, kickers, or punters, assuming that 
he plays that position.  
Through survival analysis, I also found that as undrafted players play more 
seasons, their survival estimates converge and eventually pass the estimates for seventh 
round draft picks. This could be due to the fact that there are lot more undrafted free 
agents than seventh round draft picks in this sample, hence, why the initial survival 
estimates are far worse to begin with for undrafted players. Once all the undrafted players 
that simply don’t belong in the NFL are weeded out in the first few years, the undrafted 
players that actually have talent and were not looked at enough have a chance to try and 
establish themselves as the same caliber as drafted players, hence, why we see all the 
survival curves start to converge at a certain point.  
This model can be applied to the other major professional sports that have a draft, 
which includes: basketball, hockey, and baseball. The results may not return the same 
result, because although, each sport faces a similar labor supply making them 
monopsonies that encourage investment in rookies, these sports require a more personal 
skill and less dependence on the rest of the team. It is easier for a player’s skill to be 
measured and create more of a fine line between players that are drafted and undrafted, 
whereas in the NFL, a player's’ success is more dependent on the rest of the team and 
certain qualities can’t be measured to accurately predict their future value. Looking 
outside of professional sports, monopsonies exist in many rural areas where there is only 
one firm that people work for.36 It may be the case that a person with a certain skill trade 
                                                
36 Tavis Barr, Udayan Roy, The effect of labor market monopsony on economic growth, In 
Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 30, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1446-1467, ISSN 0164-0704, 
30 
 
lives in between two different rural areas with very similar monopsony firms, creating a 
competitive market for his skills and, therefore, increasing his salary. Monopsony labor 
markets also occur in the healthcare industry, where hospitals take advantage of labor 
supply of nurses by conglomerating to one hospital and creating an environment where 
nurses with a better education will receive a higher salary, which is still below their 
marginal revenue product.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2008.05.001.(http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0
164070408000360) 
37 J.D. Matsudaira, Monopsony in Health Labor Markets, In Encyclopedia of Health Economics, 
edited by Anthony J. Culyer,, Elsevier, San Diego, 2014, Pages 325-333, ISBN 9780123756794, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375678-7.01109-3. 
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123756787011093) 
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Table 1 
Variable	 Obs	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	
Age	 19,868	 26.5154	 3.328497	 21	 46	
Games	Played	 19,583	 10.59097	 5.597082	 1	 16	
Games	Started	 19,551	 5.25968	 6.079695	 0	 18	
Weight	 19,990	 242.9355	 44.97969	 150	 376	
Height	 19,751	 74.02314	 2.555594	 65	 81	
Season	 19,995	 4.493723	 3.202448	 1	 23	
 
Diagram 1 
 
 
Table 2 
Round	 DB	 DL	 K	 LB	 LS	 OL	 P	 QB	 RB	 TE	 Total	
1	 525	 561	 10	 410	 0	 464	 0	 258	 211	 121	 2,876	
2	 509	 354	 18	 364	 0	 365	 0	 99	 156	 134	 2,297	
3	 382	 373	 11	 304	 0	 365	 20	 95	 137	 169	 2,177	
4	 403	 301	 19	 313	 0	 325	 22	 61	 209	 136	 2,002	
5	 365	 257	 26	 245	 3	 244	 54	 41	 154	 125	 1,625	
6	 287	 219	 51	 182	 0	 234	 44	 74	 167	 121	 1,503	
7	 273	 225	 29	 238	 0	 220	 36	 57	 152	 108	 1,487	
Undrafted	 1,076	 772	 260	 936	 62	 742	 183	 149	 737	 367	 5,883	
Total	 3,820	 3,062	 424	 2,992	 65	 2,959	 359	 834	 1,923	 1,281	 19,850	
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Table 3 
Round	 In	 Exit	 Total	
Exit	
Percentage	
1	 2,307	 569	 2,876	 20%	
2	 1,884	 414	 2,298	 18%	
3	 1,772	 406	 2,178	 19%	
4	 1,606	 408	 2,014	 20%	
5	 1,291	 342	 1,633	 21%	
6	 1,187	 323	 1,510	 21%	
7	 1,122	 384	 1,506	 25%	
Undrafted	 4,360	 1,614	 5,974	 27%	
Total	 15,529	 4,460	 19,989	 22%	
 
Table 4 
Year	 In	 Exit	 Total	 Exit	Percentage	
2008	 1,495	 400	 1,895	 21%	
2009	 1,546	 414	 1,960	 21%	
2010	 1,573	 443	 2,016	 22%	
2011	 1,540	 447	 1,987	 22%	
2012	 1,530	 488	 2,018	 24%	
2013	 1,543	 471	 2,014	 23%	
2014	 1,533	 514	 2,047	 25%	
2015	 1,460	 591	 2,051	 29%	
2016	 1,349	 686	 2,035	 34%	
2017	 1,943	 0	 1,943	 0%	
Total	 15,512	 4,454	 19,966	 22%	
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Table 5 
Team	 In	 Exit	 Total	
Exit	
Percentage	
Arizona	Cardinals	 459	 136	 595	 23%	
Atlanta	Falcons	 444	 137	 581	 24%	
Baltimore	Ravens	 499	 126	 625	 20%	
Buffalo	Bills	 504	 138	 642	 21%	
Carolina	Panthers	 488	 141	 629	 22%	
Chicago	Bears	 465	 167	 632	 26%	
Cincinatti	Bengals	 513	 100	 613	 16%	
Cleveland	Browns	 484	 151	 635	 24%	
Dallas	Cowboys	 497	 123	 620	 20%	
Denver	Broncos	 462	 133	 595	 22%	
Detriot	Lions	 475	 182	 657	 28%	
Green	Bay	Packers	 506	 100	 606	 17%	
Houston	Texans	 493	 131	 624	 21%	
Indianapolis	Colts	 510	 171	 681	 25%	
Jacksonville	Jaguars	 512	 160	 672	 24%	
Kansas	City	Chiefs	 472	 142	 614	 23%	
LA	Chargers	 498	 147	 645	 23%	
LA	Rams	 489	 135	 624	 22%	
Miami	Dolphins	 499	 149	 648	 23%	
Minnesota	Vikings	 465	 111	 576	 19%	
New	England	
Patriots	 531	 120	 651	 18%	
New	Orleans	Saints	 470	 166	 636	 26%	
New	York	Giants	 467	 159	 626	 25%	
New	York	Jets	 485	 137	 622	 22%	
Oakland	Raiders	 467	 147	 614	 24%	
Philadelphia	Eagles	 480	 114	 594	 19%	
Pittsburgh	Steelers	 465	 125	 590	 21%	
San	Francisco	49ers	 479	 126	 605	 21%	
Seattle	Seahawks	 516	 130	 646	 20%	
Tampa	Bay	
Buccaneers	 497	 155	 652	 24%	
Tennesse	Titans	 464	 142	 606	 23%	
Washington	
Redskins	 474	 159	 633	 25%	
Total	 15,529	 4,460	 19,989	 22%	
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Table 6  
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (Base) (UDFA) (Seventh) 
Undrafted Free Agent  0.300***  
  (0.0339)  
Age 0.0853*** 0.0894*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0131) (0.0124) 
Wt 0.0001  0.0002  0.0000  
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Height -0.0255*** -0.0284*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) 
Year (0.0055) (0.0042) (0.0010) 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
2.Season  -0.384*** -0.434*** 
  (0.0594) (0.0591) 
3.Season  -0.304*** -0.394*** 
  (0.0629) (0.0620) 
4.Season  -0.318*** -0.450*** 
  (0.0707) (0.0689) 
5.Season  -0.430*** -0.606*** 
  (0.0823) (0.0796) 
6.Season  -0.422*** -0.639*** 
  (0.0930) (0.0894) 
7.Season  -0.307*** -0.563*** 
  (0.1030) (0.0986) 
8.Season  -0.324*** -0.616*** 
  (0.1160) (0.1100) 
9.Season  (0.1100) -0.440*** 
  (0.1270) (0.1200) 
10.Season  (0.1930) -0.561*** 
  (0.1430) (0.1360) 
11.Season  (0.1870) -0.584*** 
  (0.1590) (0.1520) 
12.Season  (0.1580) -0.588*** 
  (0.1770) (0.1690) 
13.Season  (0.2630) -0.720*** 
  (0.2010) (0.1930) 
14.Season  (0.3270) -0.800*** 
  (0.2290) (0.2210) 
15.Season  (0.3310) -0.843*** 
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  (0.2620) (0.2540) 
16.Season  (0.2240) -0.783*** 
  (0.3050) (0.2960) 
17.Season  0.0133  -0.595* 
  (0.3610) (0.3530) 
18.Season  -1.227** -1.873*** 
  (0.6220) (0.6170) 
19.Season  (1.0990) -1.746** 
  (0.7520) (0.7460) 
20.Season  (0.9970) -1.693** 
  (0.7530) (0.7480) 
21.Season  (0.2030) (0.8330) 
  (0.6130) (0.6100) 
22.Season  -1.761* -2.374** 
  (1.0450) (1.0410) 
23o.Season  - - 
    
Atlanta Falcons  0.0378  0.0207  
  (0.1220) (0.1220) 
Baltimore Ravens  (0.0861) (0.0943) 
  (0.1250) (0.1250) 
Buffalo Bills  (0.0792) (0.0696) 
  (0.1230) (0.1230) 
Carolina Panthers  0.0390  0.0566  
  (0.1210) (0.1210) 
Chicago Bears  0.220* 0.211* 
  (0.1170) (0.1160) 
Cincinatti Bengals  -0.257* -0.288** 
  (0.1330) (0.1330) 
Cleveland Browns  0.1110  0.1200  
  (0.1210) (0.1210) 
Dallas Cowboys  (0.0667) (0.0569) 
  (0.1260) (0.1260) 
Denver Broncos  0.0391  0.0304  
  (0.1230) (0.1230) 
Detriot Lions  0.278** 0.275** 
  (0.1150) (0.1140) 
Green Bay Packers  -0.255* -0.253* 
  (0.1330) (0.1330) 
Houston Texans  (0.0214) (0.0375) 
  (0.1240) (0.1240) 
Indianapolis Colts  0.1360  0.1460  
  (0.1160) (0.1160) 
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Jacksonville Jaguars  0.1600  0.1550  
  (0.1180) (0.1180) 
Kansas City Chiefs  0.1190  0.1240  
  (0.1210) (0.1210) 
LA Chargers  0.0202  0.0434  
  (0.1200) (0.1200) 
LA Rams  0.0488  0.0470  
  (0.1230) (0.1230) 
Miami Dolphins  0.0328  0.0288  
  (0.1210) (0.1210) 
Minnesota Vikings  (0.1060) (0.1140) 
  (0.1290) (0.1290) 
New England Patriots  (0.1770) (0.1610) 
  (0.1260) (0.1260) 
New Orleans Saints  0.1500  0.1670  
  (0.1170) (0.1170) 
New York Giants  0.217* 0.208* 
  (0.1180) (0.1180) 
New York Jets  (0.0011) 0.0051  
  (0.1220) (0.1220) 
Oakland Raiders  0.1300  0.1170  
  (0.1200) (0.1200) 
Philadelphia Eagles  (0.1360) (0.1430) 
  (0.1280) (0.1280) 
Pittsburgh Steelers  (0.0828) (0.0700) 
  (0.1250) (0.1250) 
San Francisco 49ers  (0.0451) (0.0456) 
  (0.1250) (0.1250) 
Seattle Seahawks  (0.0661) (0.0513) 
  (0.1240) (0.1240) 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers 0.1330  0.1530  
  (0.1190) (0.1190) 
Tennesse Titans  0.1010  0.0751  
  (0.1210) (0.1210) 
Washington Redskins  0.1310  0.1280  
  (0.1180) (0.1180) 
Round 2 (0.0652)   
 (0.0651)   
Round 3 0.0089    
 (0.0654)   
Round 4 0.0850    
 (0.0655)   
Round 5 0.148**   
 (0.0691)   
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Round 6 0.148**   
 (0.0704)   
Round 7 0.362***   
 (0.0670)   
Undrafted 0.395***   
 (0.0494)   
Seventh Round   0.191*** 
   (0.0544) 
Constant 9.1230  6.8980  0.0255  
 (10.6200) (10.6900) (10.6700) 
    
Observations 19698  19697 19697  
Standard errors in 
parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1    
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